Netherlands Muslim|majority Netherlands Muslim Population Muslims in the Netherlands Muslims in the Netherlands Violence Dutch Government and Muslims Dutch Law On Muslims Dutch Muslims Holland Muslim Problem
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|Islam by country|
The early history of Islam in the Netherlands can be traced to 16th century when Ottoman traders began settling in the nation's port cities. While religious exposure arrived via trade partnerships, improvised Mosques in Amsterdam were first constructed in the early 17th century. In the ensuing timeframe, the Netherlands experienced sporadic Muslim immigration from the Dutch East Indies during its status as a colony of the Netherlands. Starting with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire through the independence of Indonesia, the greater Kingdom of the Netherlands contained the world's largest Muslim citizenry. However, the number of Muslims in the Kingdom's European territories were limited, accounting for less than 0.1% of the domestic population.
The Netherlands' economic resurgence in the 1960 to 1973 timeframe motivated the Dutch government to recruit migrant labor, chiefly from Turkey and Morocco. Later waves of immigrants arrived through family reunification and asylum seeking. A notable portion of Muslim immigrants also arrived from now-independent colonies, primarily Indonesia and Suriname. Statistics from 2009 show that the Netherlands is home to an estimated 825,000 Muslims, accounting for 4,5% of the local population. Most of the Netherlands' Muslims reside in the nation's four major cities, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. The Netherlands' first planned mosque was Mobarak Mosque, built by Ahmadiyyas.
In the early 17th century a delegation from the Dutch Republic visited Morocco to discuss a common alliance against Spain and the Barbary pirates. Sultan Zidan Abu Maali appointed Samuel Pallache as his envoy, and in 1608 Pallache met with stadholder Maurice of Nassau and the States-General in The Hague.
On December 24, 1610, the two nations signed a treaty recognising free commerce between the Netherlands and Morocco, and allowing the sultan to purchase ships, arms and munitions from the Dutch.
In the 19th century the Netherlands administered the archipelago that would become Indonesia, a majority-Muslim country with the largest Muslim population in the world. The first Muslims who settled in the Netherlands were these islanders who fled from its bloody war of Independence.
During the 1960s and 1970s the Netherlands needed a larger labour force for the labour intense jobs in the lower educated sectors. These sectors were short of workers because of the traditionally service-oriented Dutch economy. The Netherlands concluded recruitment agreements with countries like Turkey and Morocco, allowing people from these countries to stay in the Netherlands (smaller numbers of Muslim immigrants in this time came from Tunisia and Algeria).
Official work immigration ended in 1973, but the number of Moroccans and Turks remained on the increase as immigrants brought their family to the country using family reunification laws. A number of Surinamese Muslims came to the Netherlands before and after the independence of Suriname in 1975.
Apart from asylum seekers, currently most Muslim immigration takes place through marriage migration and family reunification laws. Most Moroccan and Turkish 1st and 2nd generation immigrants married people from their home countries.[
Because of increasingly restrictive legislation on family formation and reunification, the number of immigrants from Turkey and Morocco has decreased sharply since 2003. Immigrants from Turkey decreased from 6,703 in 2003 to 3,175 in 2006, and immigrants from Morocco decreased more than halved from 4,894 to 2,085.
According to Statistics Netherlands (CBS), a Dutch governmental institution, about 5% of the total Dutch population are Muslims (24 October 2007). Earlier statistics presented by the CBS showed a larger number of Muslims, but this information was solely based on ethnicity and not on religious belief. Since 2007 a reduction of around 50.000 Muslims was measured by the CBS, but this is not seen as a significant drop; it is seen as a result of improved research parameters. Secularisation of the second generation has nonetheless been observed, mostly amongst young citizens of Iranian and Turkish background with respectively half and a third of these groups not belonging to any religious affiliation.
Like most non-Western immigrants, most Muslims live in the four major cities of the country, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. An estimated 140,000 Muslims reside in the capital where they form around 17 per cent of the population. Half of these Muslims are predominantly Arabic and Berber-speaking communities from the Maghreb region, Egypt and the Middle East. Turks make up 25 per cent of the Muslim population in Amsterdam. There are also relatively many Turks in Enschede, Arnhem and Zaanstad.
There were 850,000 Dutch residents who professed Islam in 2006. Of this 38% were ethnic Turkish, 31% were Moroccan, 26% were other Asian/African, 4% were European (Non-Dutch) and 1% (12,000 people) were native Dutch. 40,000 of the Muslims were Pakistanis, 34,000 were Surinamese, 31,000 were Afghan and 27,000 were Iraqi.
There are about 400 mosques in the Netherlands, with about 200 Turkish mosques, 140 Moroccan mosques and 50 Surinamese.
Broken down by ethnic group, Turks have more organisations than Moroccans and networks between these organisations are closer.
The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community was built in 1947. Ahmadiyya Muslim Community Netherlands is the main umbrella organization. Mubarak Mosque in The Hague was inaugurated by Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, who was serving as the President and Head Judge of the International Court of Justice at The Hague
There are about 45 Islamic elementary schools, and two high schools.
Whereas all foreign nationals who have legally resided in the country for five years have the right to vote in local elections, Moroccans traditionally turn out in low numbers, while turnout among Turks is comparable to that among native Dutch.
After the 2003 elections, there were at least ten MPs from Muslim background among the 150 Members of Parliament, but as few as three among them may have been active believers, while two explicitly classified themselves as ex-Muslims.
Geert Wilders of the Dutch Party for Freedom was put on trial for inciting racial hatred, relating to his inflammatory comments regarding Islam in early October 2010. Wilders was acquitted on June 23, 2011, the judge citing that his comments were legitimate political debate, but on the edge of legal acceptability.
The murder of Theo van Gogh by Mohammed Bouyeri, a Dutch citizen of Moroccan descent, on 2 November 2004, as well as the arrest of the Hofstad Group on charges of terrorism, caused a lot of discussion about Islam and its place in Dutch society. The possibility of banning the burka was discussed in the cabinet.
Following the murder of Theo van Gogh, a number of websites appeared praising the murder and making death threats against other people. At the same time, starting with four arson attacks on mosques in the weekend after the murder, a significant number of apparently retaliatory incidents took place. By November 8, Christian churches were in turn targeted. A report for the Anne Frank Foundation and the University of Leiden counted a total of 174 violent incidents in November, specifying that mosques were the target of violence 47 times, and churches 13 times.
Between 23 November 2004 and 13 March 2005, the National Dutch Police Services Agency (KLPD) recorded 31 occasions of violence against mosques and Islamic schools. The case that drew most attention was an arson attack that led to the destruction of a Muslim primary school in Uden in December 2004. The period of heightened tensions between Dutch and Muslim communities was also evidenced by several confrontations between what are known as the "Lonsdale Youth" (Dutch youth groups characterised by their preference for Lonsdale clothing, which is often popular with Neo-Nazi groups) and Turkish and Moroccan youths in provincial towns like Venray.
These incidents took place against the backdrop of increasingly suspicious and fearful perceptions of Muslims, which have developed over a longer time. In May 2006, a poll by Motivaction / GPD (1,200 Dutch adults +/- 3%) found that 63% of Dutch citizens felt that Islam is incompatible with modern European life. A poll of June 2004 found that 68% felt threatened by "immigrant or Muslim young people", 53% feared a terrorist attack by Muslims in the Netherlands, and 47% feared that at some point, they would have to live according to Islamic rules in the Netherlands.
Feelings of fear or distrust coincide with a high degree of social segregation. About two-thirds of Turks and Moroccans "associate predominantly with members of their own ethnic group," while a similar proportion of native Dutch "have little or no contact at all with immigrants." Moreover, contacts between the groups are decreasing, notably those between second generation Turks and Moroccans and native Dutch.
In 2006 Minister of Justice Piet Hein Donner provoked a widespread public outcry when he suggested the Netherlands might accept Sharia law in a constitutional manner. "It is a sure certainty for me: if two thirds of all Netherlanders tomorrow would want to introduce Sharia, then this possibility must exist. Could you block this legally? It would also be a scandal to say 'this isn't allowed! The majority counts. That is the essence of democracy."  The statements were categorically refused by parties across the political spectrum, as well as by one Muslim leader.
When two Muslim politicians, Nebahat Albayrak and Ahmed Aboutaleb, both of whom hold foreign as well as Dutch passports, were proposed as state secretaries in 2007 a discussion was started by the Party for Freedom (PVV) about dual citizenship and the possibility of foreign citizens to hold office. No other political party joined the PVV in their opinion. After their appointment a motion of no confidence was entered by Geert Wilders, which also did not get any support from any other political party. A week later the PVV entered a motion of no confidence against parliament member Khadija Arib who serves on an advisory council to King Mohammed VI of Morocco; this motion was also defeated without any support from the other parties in parliament. In a country with as many as 2 million residents with dual citicenship, it would prove virtually impossible for any political party to put forward a list of candidates without the odd dual citizen. Even within the PVV itself the policy failed when party representatives turned out to have Turkish and Israeli passports.
After the murder of Theo van Gogh in November 2004, Minister of Integration and Immigration Rita Verdonk commissioned an inquiry into the radicalization of young Muslims. The conclusion was that many of them experience alienation, feeling disconnected with both their first-generation immigrant parents and from Dutch society. Previous reports had already found that young Muslims don't share the deep ethno-national attachment their parents feel with their country of origin, and instead are coming to identify primarily with their religion. While they participate less in religious activities than their parents, they more strongly link their identity with Islam and with the global Muslim community; radical and orthodox Islamic groups offer some of these young Muslims clear answers and a firm sense of belonging. While prior research found that the degree of religiosity in general decreases among Muslims with higher education and stable employment, the new report noted that highly educated young Muslims can also experience "relative deprivation" all the more strongly - the sense that despite their efforts they receive fewer opportunities than native Dutch of the same generation - and turn to radicalism in anger and frustration.